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An Analysis of the Methodologies adopted by CSR Rating Agencies 
Abstract 
Purpose: This paper analyses the similarities and differences in the methodologies adopted 
by CSR (corporate social responsibility) rating agencies.  
Design/methodology: We gather secondary and primary evidence of practices from selected 
agencies on the methodologies and criteria they rely upon to assess a firm's CSR performance. 
Findings: We find evidence of similarities in the methodologies adopted by the CSR rating 
agencies (e.g. the use of environment, social and governance themes, exclusion criteria, 
adoption of positive criteria, client/'customised' input, quantification), but also several 
elements of differences emerge, namely in terms of the thresholds for exclusion, transparent 
vs. confidential approach, industry-specific ratings, and weights for each dimension. Drawing 
from Sandberg et al.’s (2009) conceptualisations, we tentatively argue that this mixed picture 
may reflect competing organisational pressures to adopt a differentiation approach at the 
strategic and practical levels whilst recognising, and incorporating, the ‘globalising’ 
tendencies of the CSR business at the terminological levels.   
Implications: Although our data is based on a relatively small number of agencies, our 
findings and analysis convey some implications for users of CSR ratings and policy-makers; 
particularly in light of the recent Paris 2016 Agreement on Climate Change and the increased 
emphasis on the monitoring of social, environmental and governance performance.  
Originality: We contribute to the literature by highlighting how key intermediate rating 
organisations operationalise notions of CSR.  
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility (CSR); CSR rating agencies; Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI) 
Classification: Research paper  
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1. Introduction  
There has been increasing attention paid by market and societal actors to the social 
performance of corporations and the gradual embedding of ethical investment in mainstream 
finance. As a result, there has been a noticeable reliance on CSR (corporate social 
responsibility) Rating Agencies as intermediate institutions which claim to provide a 
structured and reliable assessment of an enterprise’s engagement with the multiple, and often 
ambiguous, facets of corporate social responsibility (Chelli & Gendron, 2013; Archel et al., 
2011; Scalet & Kelly, 2010; Bessire & Onnee, 2010).  
 
CSR rating agencies aspire to bring a sense of order to the field (Scalet & Kelly, 2010) by 
collating insights from different information sources (including from the reporting entity 
itself) and presenting generally quantifiable indicators of corporate social performance (Chelli 
& Gendron, 2013; Malsch, 2013). In turn, these indicators inform decision makers on an 
investment’s social credentials (e.g. ethical investment funds, pension funds) and the risks 
attached to an enterprise’s ethical profile (Sandberg et al., 2009; Scalet & Kelly, 2010; Bessire 
& Onnee, 2010). The users of ratings agencies also include non-financial stakeholders such as 
government (e.g. in procurement; refer to D’Hollander and Marx, 2014), non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and other user or pressure groups. However, financial stakeholders and 
investment decisions tend to be the main motivations for the multiplication and increased 
visibility of agencies worldwide (Rhodes & Soobaroyen, 2010; Hedesstrom et al., 2011; 
Sustainability, 2012; Malsch, 2013; Scott et al., 2014; Dilla et al., 2016). At the same time, 
there remains a ‘black box’ in terms of understanding how ratings are devised by agencies and 




Similar to the case of other accreditation institutions (e.g. credit rating agencies; quality 
accreditation firms) and in tandem with accounting firms and professional bodies (Malsch, 
2013), CSR rating agencies deploy indicators and other ranking criteria which enables them to 
provide their services to market players and to represent themselves as credible assessors of 
corporate social performance. This credibility is also visibly reflected in an increased reliance 
on the data provided by CSR rating agencies (principally categorised in terms of 
environmental-, social- and governance-related items) by many academic studies. This is 
motivated by a search for quantitative proxies of corporate social performance (Igalens et al., 
2008; Bessire & Onnee, 2010; Semenova & Hassel, 2014; Scott et al., 2014), particularly 
those deemed to be outside the direct control of the reporting enterprise (Parguel et al., 2011). 
Bessire & Onnee (2010) argue that many agencies adopt a utilitarian ideology privileging 
scientific methods, quantitative measures (metrics), financial-led clients and transparency of 
the methodologies. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that many agencies are not very 
transparent (SustainAbility, 2012) and noted differences have emerged between the ratings 
themselves (Woods & Jones, 1995; Entine, 2003; Koehn & Ueng, 2005; Chatterji & Levine, 
2008; Sandberg et al., 2009; Hedesstrom et al., 2011). So far, there have been limited 
assessments of their methodologies (Hedesstrom et al., 2011; Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2010).  
 
Informed by the above, this study examines the ratings methodologies of a group of CSR 
rating agencies, focusing on the following key research question: How do these agencies 
operationalise CSR in their evaluation criteria and methodologies? What are the key 
similarities and differences? To answer these research questions, we first carried out a 
secondary data analysis of the rating methodologies as disclosed on the agencies’ websites, 
including publicly available documents relating to their services and activities. Secondly, we 
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contacted a group of agencies to examine their criteria, CSR dimensions and the extent to 
which industry differences are accounted for. 
 
Briefly, the findings, albeit from a relatively small number of organisations, reveal that the 
ratings methodologies adopted by the responding agencies display some similarities in 
relation to the CSR themes being assessed, the exclusion criteria, the adoption of positive 
criteria and the prominence of client-led criteria. At the same time, areas of differences are 
observed in terms of the threshold for exclusion, the use of industry-specific criteria and 
weights to assess social performance.  
 
Our paper contributes to the literature as follows. Firstly, our findings extend the prior 
insights from Hedesstrom et al. (2011) and to a lesser extent, Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010), in 
that the rating methodologies reflect a rather ’adaptive’ attitude to the measurement of 
environmental, social and governance performance, in the sense that the methodologies 
change from one CSR rating agency to another. Exclusion criteria are in practice not 
particularly restrictive and what could be considered as a ‘material’ involvement in 
controversial businesses appears to vary significantly. Secondly, Igalens et al. (2008) and 
Sandberg et al. (2009) highlighted the potentially national or cultural character ingrained in 
some ratings (e.g. is gambling an acceptable business in given regions/countries?). Whilst 
acknowledging that we can only draw our conclusions from a limited set of countries and 
these will need further validation, we note that such national or cultural aspects did not 
emerge from our data. Thirdly, Chelli & Gendron (2013) investigated 37 rating agencies 
worldwide but were more concerned with the commonality of their public discourses and the 
quantification agenda underlying the methodologies adopted by ratings agencies. However, 
when these agencies were directly prompted for information, we instead noted an apparent 
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combination of commonality and difference of the methodologies and criteria, principally 
arising due to market and commercial rationales. In our overall discussion of the findings, we 
draw upon Sandberg et al. (2009)’s conceptualisations to provide a tentative analysis of the 
findings. Admittedly, an assessment of a firm’s corporate social performance on the basis of a 
given rating which then differs from the one devised by another rating agency may be 
acceptable for some informed users (e.g. analysts; investors), but not necessarily for others 
(e.g. social stakeholders). Nonetheless, our study has implications for all users of CSR ratings 
in that it highlights where areas of differences between agency ratings are more likely to 
emerge and thereby enable users to critically evaluate the reliability and relevance of these 
criteria.   
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
extant literature and is then followed by an explanation of the theoretical perspective. 
Subsequently, the data and methods are outlined and the findings and analysis are presented. 
Finally, the implications and contributions are discussed in the concluding section of the 
paper.   
 
2. Literature Review  
Several studies have used or exploited ratings, scores and rankings produced by so-called 
sustainable indices, CSR rating agencies or even CSR information providers but few of them 
have questioned the validity and reliability of these measurements. A notable exception is the 
work the work published in a recent special issue on the reliability of sustainability indicators 
(refer to Scott et al., 2014). For instance, Allouche & Laroche (2006), Griffin & Mahon 
(1997) and others (refer to Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003 for a more extensive 
list of such studies) relied on CSR ratings to examine the relationship between the corporate 
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social performance (CSP) and the financial performance of the firm. A number of studies also 
attempted to propose different approaches for measuring CSR (Dillenburg et al., 2003; 
Gauthier, 2005; Knoepfel, 2001; Knox & Maklan, 2004; Marquez & Fombrun, 2005; 
Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Miller et al., 2007). It should be noted that the literature does rely 
on a plethora of terminologies in relation CSR ratings, such as Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI) metrics, Sustainability Ratings, Economic, Social and Governance (ESG) 
measures. In this paper, we have selected the term ‘CSR ratings’ and consider it to be largely 
interchangeable to the other terms for the benefit of the discussion, although we do 
acknowledge that there are differences/overlaps between these terms.    
 
Some authors critically assessed the quality of ratings of the most used or known agencies or 
indices. Igalens & Gond (2005) have conducted an analysis of the data provided in 2000 by 
ARESE, the leading French rating agency at the time, while Sharfman (1996), Mattingly & 
Berman (2006) and Chatterji et al. (2009) have assessed in different ways the most widely 
used ratings, namely those by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research and Analytics (KLD). In 
spite of their increasing popularity, CSR ratings have been rarely evaluated and have been 
criticized for their own lack of transparency (Chatterji et al, 2008). Hedesström et al. (2011) 
consider that CSR ratings agencies should communicate to investors and companies the 
theoretical and empirical basis upon which environmental evaluation criteria are selected, and 
address the criticisms relating to the validity of CSR ratings. The issue of insufficient 
empirical and theoretical justification has also been previously discussed. Entine (2003), for 
example, argues that raters assign high marks to firms that are later more likely to be 
embroiled in scandals. Hawken (2004, p. 16) criticised socially responsible investing (SRI), 
noting that “the screening methodologies and exceptions employed by most SRI mutual funds 
allow practically any publicly-held corporation to be considered as an SRI portfolio 
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company.” Indeed, there does not seem to be any set uniform standards which all CSR rating 
agencies could comply with. At the same time, one may question whether it is desirable to 
have uniformity in the assessment of ‘what is (or ought to be)’ corporate social performance 
(Sandberg et al., 2009). Not only do CSR rating agencies appear to differ about how to weigh 
a given criterion (such as the treatment of employees versus the respect of the environment), 
but they also differ about what constitutes relevant data for assessing the criteria. Thus, it 
would be impossible to compare results across agencies (Scalet and Kelly, 2009), leading to 
some academic work examining the fit between competing ratings (e.g. Sharfman, 1996; 
Chatterji et al., 2008; Semenova & Hassel, 2014). This also raises the question of consistency 
because when respective rating schemes of the different analyst organizations vary in terms of 
evaluation criteria, this could result in the same company receiving favourable ratings from 
some analyst organizations and comparatively poorer ratings from others (Hedesström et al., 
2011). Dilla et al. (2016) equally mentioned this issue when they examined how 
nonprofessional investors use their SRI screens and found that nonprofessional SRI investors 
relied on filtered environmental performance information from rating agencies to make 
comparisons across individual companies. While admitting that the filtered information from 
rating agencies may make it easier for investors to compare the social performance of 
individual companies, the authors raise the issue of a lack of consistency due to the presence 
of substantial differences in the type of environmental performance measures reported by 
those rating agencies. 
 
This lack of consistency and transparency may be troubling to many, particularly for those 
who expect that CSR ratings can be objectified and made functional, thereby conveying a 
generally accepted reality of ‘corporate social performance’; akin to a bottom-line accounting 
metric. However, corporations are given mixed messages about what is being measured 
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(Dillenburg et al., 2003), with the question of ratings convergence having different 
implications for institutional investors, the evaluated firms, civil society and for academic 
research in the field (Hedesström et al., 2011). There has been very little empirical 
substantiation in the academic literature to underpin a debate about the need for ratings to be 
converging (Hedesström et al., 2011). For instance, the most examined CSR ratings were 
those by KLD. Sharfman (1996) studied the validity of the KLD data by comparing it to other 
more accepted measures of CSP. He found that KLD ratings correlated sufficiently with other 
measures of CSP thus indicating a sufficient level of reliability. Mattingly and Berman (2006) 
also assessed KLD ratings and found that positive and negative social actions are both 
empirically and conceptually distinct constructs and should not be combined in future 
research. Chatterji et al. (2009) find the KLD ‘concern’ ratings to be fairly good summaries of 
past environmental performance. In addition, firms with more KLD concerns have slightly, 
but statistically significantly, more pollution and regulatory compliance violations in later 
years. KLD environmental strengths, in contrast, do not accurately predict pollution levels or 
compliance violations. More recently, Semenova & Hassel (2014) examined the correlation 
between the different environmental scores assigned to companies by several CSR rating 
agencies and found some evidence of consistency between the different ratings, albeit this is 
limited to 3 agencies (KLD, ASSET4 and GES) and to US companies only.  
 
Using data from several CSR ratings agencies such as KLD, Calvert, FTSE4Good, DJSI, and 
Innovest, Chatterji & Levine (2008) found that the major ratings did have a fairly low 
correlation with each other, supporting a market-driven differentiation strategy. Chatterji & 
Levine (2006) found similar results when they examined three major indices of the United-
States (KLD’s Domini 400, Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI), and the FTSE4Good), 
namely that the measurement systems, the resulting selections and rankings of companies 
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differed considerably. They reported several critical issues about the weighing systems, data 
collection, transparency and level of performance.  
 
In terms of the weighing attached to various components of non-financial performance, 
Chatterji & Levine (2006) noted that the above-mentioned firms have quite different 
methodologies, which results in an unreliable comparison of social performance between 
companies. This lack of uniformity undercuts the ability of stakeholders to discriminate 
among more or less reliable ratings and allows corporations to pick and choose among rating 
outcomes so as to avoid pressure to address poor social performance. Finally, Chatterji & 
Levine (2006) pointed out a lack of transparency noting that there might be good reasons to 
have different weighing systems to use as benchmarks against a user’s own portfolio, but the 
implicit motives which drive these differences in measurement are not elucidated by ratings 
firms. Indeed, a large amount of information remains impossible to obtain. This lack of 
transparency makes it difficult to understand what CSR ratings agencies are measuring and 
whether one can make reasonable comparisons between them (Chatterji & Levine, 2006). In a 
recent study Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010) again highlighted the problem of consistency and 
found that there is no standard methodology for the evaluation of corporate social 
performance. The lack of consistency between different ratings creates an issue of 
comparability and the problem seems to be compounded when the positioning of a company 
and its CSR status are expressed symbolically, or when using a numerical scale (Escrig-
Olmedo et al., 2010).  
 
Despite these differences, most agencies seek to rate companies through a combination of 
positive and negative criteria; and these are based on an adapted Stakeholder Model (Fassin, 
2009; Podnar & Jancic, 2006) and a series of global standards. Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010) 
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also noted that companies are faced with a lack of information that makes it difficult for them 
to discover which actions would enable them to perform better (and be included in a CSR 
index) and investors equally face difficulties selecting sustainable companies for investment. 
More recently, Hedesström et al., (2011, p. 130) analysed the environmental evaluation 
criteria and ratings of seven European and North American agencies and found that ratings 
differed, depending on the rating scheme used. For example, comparisons of the 
environmental ratings for the automobile sector show that there is a fairly broad consensus 
across raters as to which car manufacturers have the worst environmental performance. 
However, there is considerable disagreement as to which ones are the best performers.  
 
In conclusion to this section, there has been much concern expressed on the screening of 
investments deemed to be socially responsible or sustainable and although an assessment of 
the methodologies and criteria used by the CSR ratings have been singled out in a few studies, 
there remains a dearth of research on the rating agencies themselves.  
 
3. Data and Methods 
In line with Chelli & Gendron (2013) and Hedesström et al. (2011), we relied on the guide 
published by the French Observatory of CSR (ORSE, 2012 i) identify the current market 
players in CSR ratings. We accessed the latest version of this guide and combined it with 
other different sources to identify a list of 28 agencies (See Appendix 1). However, unlike 
Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010) who also studied CSR information providers supplying 
sustainability indices, we only selected those agencies that produce and sell CSR ratings to 
companies and investors. A large majority of these CSR rating agencies was created before 
2004 (21 agencies), while only 7 agencies were founded between 2007 and 2011. Most of 
them are European (20 agencies) while 5 agencies are from Asia, 2 from Australia and one 
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from Central America (Mexico). When analyzing the websites of these agencies, we noticed 
that six of them (CAER, IMUG, Greeneye, Ecovalores, KO-CSR and ECODES) are partners 
of the British agency ‘EIRIS’ and hence part of its network i.e. they apply the same 
methodology of rating as EIRISii. In addition, ‘Ethibel’, the Belgian agency was absorbed by 
its French counterpart ‘Vigeo’ in 2005. Thus, if we consider not the number of agencies but 
their approaches to assessment and evaluation that are supposed to be different, we concluded 
that we have 21 potentially different methodologies of ratings. 
 
From an initial assessment of the public documents available on the websites of each agency, 
we noted a lack of information about their methodologies and even less so when it came to 
their evaluation criteria. This was raised by some authors like Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010, 
p.448) who consider this lack of information as a result in itself. The only exception was SAM 
Research, a Swiss rating agency which publishes a guide on its website detailing its approach 
and methodology, which provided concrete examples of its evaluation criteria and the weights 
it assigns to them on the basis of the industry being evaluated. We developed a set of thematic 
questions (see Appendix 2) based on what agencies concretely do and we were particularly 
drawn by the presentation and classification made by SAM Research. These questions were 
also adapted from those used in prior work (Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2010; Hedesstrom et al., 
2011; Sustainability, 2012). The first set of questions examines the exclusion criteria used by 
the agency. Considering that some approaches/methods of rating exclude certain industries for 
religious, moral or political reasons or for their involvement in activities that threaten the 
environment, the human health or the ecosystem, we asked the agencies if they used 
exclusionary criteria of any nature in their assessment process. Agencies also had to mention 




The second part of the questions sought to identify the CSR themes used by the agency in its 
assessment process. According to the most common definitions of CSR iii , a firm’s 
responsibility is threefold: economic, social and environmental. So we asked the agencies 
about the CSR themes they consider in their evaluation process, in order to know if they use 
all three dimensions or only some of them.  We also asked the agencies to supply the weight 
they assign to each dimension in their evaluation, regardless of the industry examined. Again, 
we aimed to assess if the evaluation system gives some preference to a specific dimension 
rather than another. For example, one CSR rating agency could focus on the environmental 
dimension either by measuring this theme only or by giving it a higher weighing compared to 
the other dimensions.   
 
The third and final part looked at the selection criteria. In order to evaluate all the CSR 
dimensions/themes, rating agencies define, examine and check numerous criteria for each 
dimension. These criteria can be common to all the companies regardless of the industry to 
which they belong (general criteria) or can change according to the industry to which the 
assessed company belongs (industry-specific criteria)iv. We were not interested in the criteria 
themselves since they can vary from one agency to another depending on the qualification and 
the interpretation the agency makes of the dimension it evaluates and the priorities it identifies 
when assessing it. Instead, we preferred to focus on the nature of these criteria rather than 
their number, taking into account the large number of criteria that can exist for each 
dimension and the aversion of the agencies to display them. Thus, we asked our agencies if 
they use a general criterion when assessing companies or did they adapt their criteria 
according to the industry to which the assessed company belongs. A combination of both 
types of criteria was also possible. CSR rating agencies can employ general criteria and at the 
same time use some industry-specific criteria. In every case, it would be interesting to know 
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the weight of each type of criteria in the evaluation process. To contextualize the answers, we 
asked each agency to inform us of the typical weight of the general criterion it uses in the 
evaluation of each dimension. Similar to Hedesström et al. (2011) who focused on two 
industries (automobile and paper/forestry) to study environmental performance ratings, we 
focused on three industries (Banks, Electricity and Pharmaceutical companies) and asked for 
the weight of the industry-specific criteria. We have selected them as illustrations for our 
study but admittedly, a selection of different industries may lead to more different or similar 
assessments. 
 
We made contact with the 28 CSR rating agencies by email to request for their participation. 
After further direct contacts, 10 agencies agreed to respond to our request for information 
underlying the prior difficulties encountered by researchers in the field (Escrig-Olmedo et al., 
2010; Hedesstrom et al., 2011). Whilst our intention is not to claim a statistical generalization, 
it is also important to note that we made contact with the relevant specialists or relatively 
senior individuals in the firm (e.g. Research Director, ESG-Analyst, Head of sustainability 
services, Head of the agency (CEO, Director), Communications coordinator, and Head of 
market relations) which can ensure some degree of relevance in the responses. We conducted 
an average of 30 minutes to one-hour phone or Skype interviews with each of our respondents 
and where required, asked for clarifications by email. For the remainder of this paper and due 
to the confidentiality arrangements, we have coded each organization from RA1 to RA10. 
 
4. Findings 
The exclusionary approach 
Table 1 below provides a summary of the exclusionary criteria as revealed by the responding 
agencies since a tabular format can provide a snapshot of the key insights from our 
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informants. Our enquiries revealed that 5 out of 10 rating agencies adopted an exclusion 
criterion to avoid firms that are connected to so-called controversial activities, whereas the 
other agencies do not have any explicit criteria. This does not however mean the agencies 
systematically apply the criteria on companies they are required to rate. Some informants 
indeed then explained that they examine the involvement of the companies they evaluate in 
controversial sectors and let their clients (investors) decide of the exclusion (or not) of the 
firms incriminated. This means the client/investor sets him/her-self the exclusion criteria the 
rating agency should apply to create the portfolio either by choosing from a list of exclusion 
criteria or by asking for specific ones. As stated by one manager: 
“We apply a customized approach which is supposed to suit the needs of investors and reflect 
their specific perspective on sustainability, hence no general answer is possible in this case as 
it varies from client to client” (RA3) 
 
This combined approach appears to be gaining ground, and thus limiting the exclusion criteria 
approach to the gathering of information about the involvement of the audited company in 
controversial issues; the final decision of excluding or including the company in the portfolio 
thereby resting with the client (investor). For example, the RA4 informant pointed out that in 
addition to the exclusions they operate on a standard basis, they also tracked data on animal 
testing and stem cell research:  
“We exclude Alcohol, Contraceptives, Tobacco, Gambling, GMO Food Production. 
Military/Army, Nuclear Power, Pornography are excluded from [our] indices on a standard 
basis, in addition to this we do track also Animal Testing, Stem Cells. The analysis takes into 
consideration also the nature of the involvement of a company (e.g. Military/Army includes: 
Cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines; Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; 
producers of conventional armaments etc.)” (RA4) 
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The exclusion criteria used by our agencies are in most cases billed as ‘ethical’ or ‘religious’ 
in nature (for 4 agencies out of 5). This could be explained by the religious origins of SRI and 
the tradition of avoiding “sinful products”, which can be associated to the development of the 
movement in the UK and Europe (Sandberg et al., 2009), as highlighted by the following 
website disclosure by a European CSR rating agency: 
“..tobacco, alcohol, gambling, GMOs, weapons, nuclear and adult entertainment. 
Controversial practices screening includes human rights abuse, corruption and damage to the 
environment among others”. (RA10) 
 
Activities relating to the damage of the environment were also employed by two agencies (out 
of 5) as an exclusion criterion. As for the excluded industries, the vast majority of our 
agencies purported to avoid firms involved in weapon or arms manufacturing. Nuclear power 
and tobacco were also cited by 6 of those rating agencies but only 4 excluded the alcohol 
industry. To a lesser extent, other industries such as gambling, genetically modified food 
production (GMO), contraceptives, financial services, hotel industry, were also avoided. 
These examples again underline the focus made on ethical/religious and environmental issues. 
But the exclusion may also be normative and not only industry-related since some agencies 
stated that they would avoid firms that would rely on child labor for example, thereby being 
more in line with an acknowledgement of human rights and the unfair treatment of minorities 
or marginalized communities (Sandberg et al., 2009). Compared to the findings by Escrig-
Olmedo et al. (2010), our respondents seem to have defined similar items for exclusion. What 
is however new from our research is the threshold or degree of involvement that would be 




The definition of an exclusion criterion is indeed not sufficient since CSR rating agencies also 
establish the degree of involvement of the firm in the prohibited industries, products or 
activities. From the comments of the informants, the threshold of involvement in controversial 
issues often depended on clients and varied from 5% to 20% (of sales revenue) for some of 
the agencies. For some others however, this threshold could be anything from 5% to 100% of 
involvement while another argued for the exclusion of a firm at any level of involvement in 
so-called controversial activities. For example, RA4’s (a European agency) threshold is up to 
5% for the most of controversial industries like alcohol, tobacco or gambling but for some 
other categories like cluster Bombs, anti-personal landmines, nuclear, contraceptives, 
pornography or GMO, the company will be excluded, irrespective of its level of involvement. 
Once again, some rating agencies insisted on the fact that it is to the client/investor to decide 
and that their role only consists in providing the maximum information about the companies 
they were tasked to rate: 
“We just provide exclusion criteria and companies’ qualification to clients. Also we evaluate 
relative sustainability performance of the companies in the industries with exclusion criteria. 
The clients decide whether they will exclude it or not” (RA8) 
 
The CSR themes  
With regards to the CSR themes, all of them highlighted the use of the social dimension, even 
if some went further by referring to labour practices, human rights or human resource 
management. The environmental dimension was mentioned by 9 agencies while only one 
agency has cited the economic dimension of CSR as one of the themes it evaluates (RA7). 
This reflects the focus on non-economic performance and in doing so, CSR rating agencies 
maintain a position that is complementary to financial rating agencies, since it is expected that 
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investors would gather information from both agencies to create their ethical portfolio. 
Moreover, 7 agencies out of 10 stated that they evaluate the corporate governance (CG) of the 
firms. Thus, there was a relatively high level of commonality in terms of each theme.  
 
Furthermore, as reported in Table 2, the weight for each CSR theme in the process of 
evaluation was not revealed by half of our informants, either arguing that such information is 
confidential or that it is customized and thus depends on the client. Whilst this could be 
interpreted as a lack of transparency, at the same time such a decision may be motivated by a 
strategic choice; because by doing so CSR rating agencies convey the message that they 
possess a specific know-how (i.e. a form of intellectual property) and/or an ability to adapt to 
customer/investor needs. As an example, one agency manager seems to rather boast of the 
breadth of coverage and complexity of the weights/models underlying the ratings while 
another informant put forwards the firm’s technical expertise to justify this confidentiality: 
“We cover more than 150 industries sectors. Each of them have specific weighting 
configuration following sector analysis on materiality. Unfortunately, we cannot disclose this 
information” (RA1) 
 
“The weightings are not fixed but adjusted to each sector, country and company. And even in 
the case of each company the weightings are transformed through a mathematical formula. 
Our system quantifies the value of a companies´ management & business processes. We seek 
out the value drivers in each company” (RA6) 
 




For the other respondents who did reveal the weight of each CSR theme, environmental and 
social themes always predominated in terms of the weights assigned in the evaluation process 
but their weight varied according both to the rating agencies and to the industry they 
examined. For example, the environmental theme was weighed the highest in the electricity 
sector while the social theme was weighted highest in banking and pharmaceuticals. The third 
component - CG - was the less weighed one when mentioned, varying from 8% to 39% in all 
industries reviewed by the respondents. We however could not draw out a cogent explanation 
to the differences in weighting among rating agencies given the inconsistencies and somewhat 
contradictory assessments. For example, the environment was weighted from 36% to 40% by 
RA2, RA9 and RA10, in the pharmaceutical industry while RA7 weighted it only at 17% in 
the same industry. The same observation was noted for the social theme which was weighted 
from 21% to 62% in the banking industry, from 30% to 83% in the pharmaceutical industry 
and from 22% to 46% in the electricity sector (See Table 3). In each case, the difference 
between the maximum weight and the minimum weight might appear problematic but not so 
to the respondents. To justify such differences, one informant explained that his firm will:  
“apply a customized approach and it very much depends on the weightings, criteria and 
investment policy each single investor chooses to apply. Therefore, there are no general 
answers to the question you have asked but rather varying forms and contexts” (RA3) 
 
Hedesstrom et al.’s. (2011) study of environmental ratings in two industries (automobile and 
paper/forestry) did show that CSR rating agencies significantly disagreed on which firm was 
the best performer in each sector. Contrastingly, our findings actually reveal large differences 
in the weights attached to each dimension within the same sector and thereby explaining 
(arguably not to a full extent) the different outcomes by individual rating agencies.  
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“No, these three dimensions are not weighed the same. Moreover, analysts have the 
possibility to change such weights according to companies’ specificities” (RA10)  
 
The issue seems more pronounced in the case of the social dimension and this potentially 
reflected very different conceptualizations of ‘corporate social contributions’ by the CSR 
rating agencies; an insight which has not been previously uncovered by Escrig-Olmedo et al. 
(2010) and Hedesstrom et al. (2011).     
 
The typology and weight of selection criteria 
All the informants acknowledged the use of industry-specific criteria to assess the social 
performance of the firms they evaluate. Yet most of them (8 out of 10 agencies) relied on a 
general criteria applied to all industries. Not all the agencies agreed to reveal the weights 
assigned to general or industry-specific criteria in the evaluation of each CSR 
dimension/theme; two agencies did not give the weight of their general or industry-specific 
criteria again arguing it is either confidential or customized. Also, two other agencies which 
only used industry-specific criteria did not provide their weight on the same grounds. The 
confidentiality of the information was justified by our respondents on the need to preserve 
their expertise and know-how. For example, RA8 declared: “The weight of general criteria in 
each CSR theme is one of core knowhow of ESG research and confidential”. Also RA1 
informant said it has 21 CSR criteria for 150 industries but declined to provide information 
about them:  
“We have 21 CSR criteria which we apply to 150 industry sectors. Activation and weighting 
of criteria is performed based upon materiality analysis. We are not authorized to disclose 




In several of the replies to our questions, the mentioning of a ’customized’ weight appeared to 
be another way to avoid disclosing data. Whilst this may also mean that CSR rating agencies 
adapt the weight of their criteria to the needs of the client/investor, this in practical terms 
could not be done without the expertise of the agencies and their advice. So in both cases, 
rating agencies sought to put forward their know-how and yet at the same time, avoid an 
assessment as to whether the criteria and weights can be deemed appropriate. Some agencies 
do mention this aspect on their website, such as follows: 
“In order to be able to analyse comprehensively the diverse environmental and social 
challenges relating to the activities of companies, [RA2] has developed a pool of indicators. 
These currently number approximately 700. For each company, an average of 100 indicators 
is selected from this pool on an industry-specific basis so that a targeted evaluation of the 
problems specific to that company can be carried out.” (RA2)      
 
These points suggest there has been a growing trend to incorporate more ambiguity in the 
techniques of socially responsible investment (SRI) with a view to recognise the different 
values and priorities of companies and investors. Hence, it is likely that rating agencies are 
adopting what we refer to as an adaptive approach by responding to client demands and 
expectations. Hence, what appears to be a ‘problematic’ heterogeneity from an academic or 
outsider perspective of transparency and accountability may be less so in the eyes of investors 
and clientsv. This heterogeneity can also be observed in the way agencies apply a weight to 
the general or industry-specific criteria. Indeed, this weight may be the same for all the 
dimensions/themes of CSR evaluated or vary from a dimension to another depending on 
rating agencies (See Table 3 below). For example, RA4, RA6, RA7 and RA10 claim they 
applied the same weight to their general criteria regardless of the theme evaluated (and of 
course, as a consequence, the same weight to the industry-specific criteria). Yet, this weight 
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differed subsequently between them as we record 100% for the first agency, 67% (2/3) for the 
second, 40-50% for the third and 70-90% for the last one. The second group of agencies 
applies different weights to its general criteria depending on the CSR theme being evaluated. 
For example, RA2’s weight for general ‘social dimension’ criteria represents between 60% 
and 70% while it fluctuates from 40% to 50% for RA9. The general criteria for the 
environment are weighted 40-60% by RA2 and 30-50% by RA9 which otherwise uses only 
general criteria to evaluate the corporate governance dimensions. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The same observation could be made for the industry-specific criteria. If we admit that the 
weight varies depending on the industry evaluated, no clear explanation could be drawn to 
justify the differences in weight between the different agencies.  For example, when the rated 
company belongs to the banking sector, the environmental performance is evaluated on the 
basis of 50% of industry-specific criteria by RA2 and RA9 but the same figure comes to 70% 
weight by RA7. In the case of the electricity sector, this weight is once again the same for 
RA2 and RA9 (i.e. 60%) while it rises to 83% for RA7. Another example is that of the social 
dimension which is evaluated on the basis of 30% and 35% of industry-specific criteria 
respectively by RA2 and RA7 in the same sector. RA9 uses however 70% of industry-specific 
criteria to evaluate this dimension in the same sector. Evidence of further differences between 
these agencies is observed when the rated company belongs to Pharmaceuticals with 40%, 
56% and 70% of industry-specific criteria respectively for RA2, RA7 and RA9. A final 
example which shows once again the large diversity of methods among CSR rating agencies 
is that of RA4 which applies only industry-specific criteria for two of its CSR dimensions 
(products and production process) and only general criteria for the other CSR dimensions, 
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namely environmental strategy and policy, environmental management, employees and 
human capital, community relations, markets, corporate governance and shareholders. 
 
5. Discussion and analysis of findings 
Overall, the findings from our sample of CSR rating agencies point to a picture of both 
similarities and differences in terms of ratings methodology, and are to some extent consistent 
with the findings of Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010) and Hedesstrom et al. (2011). In an attempt 
to provide a tentative explanation of the findings and potential reasons for these similarities 
and differences, we dwell further by relying on the conceptual insights suggested by Sandberg 
et al. (2009).  
 
Sandberg et al. (2009) emphasises the heterogeneity of the SRI movement and assert that 
there are four levels or dimensions where differences (and similarities) can exist, namely the 
definitional, terminological, strategic and practical levels. The definitional level relates to 
how SRI is defined within the field or by the CSR rating agencies (e.g. what is socially 
responsible investing? What is corporate social responsibility? What are environmental, social 
or governance aspects?). Sandberg et al. (2009) argues that there is overall broad agreement 
between the key actors (investors, analysts, rating agencies) on the definitional facets of CSR. 
However, diversity is said to exist on aspects relating to terminological (i.e. use of terms such 
as governance, social, environmental), strategic and practical levels. In relation to the 
strategic level, and drawing from Sandberg et al. (2009), it can be argued that CSR rating 
agencies may choose to privilege different approaches when advising clients on a company’s 
level of social performance. For example, it can emphasise a negative (what to exclude) or 
positive (what to include) criteria about company’s sustainable activities. Finally, the practical 
level relates to the actual implementation of the detailed criteria by different organisations and 
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where the potential for differences is at its highest; arguably a key level for assessing the more 
detailed aspects of the methodologies adopted by rating agencies.  
 
From the responses we obtained on the type of criteria used by the ratings agencies, we note 
that many definitional, terminological, strategic and practical aspects contained in the rating 
methodologies are quite similar and are reflected by the use of common terminologies, 
namely the. CSR dimensions (Environmental Social and Governance) and exclusionary 
themes, the adoption of positive criteria and client/’customised’ input and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, a homogeneous reliance on seeking a quantification of these dimensions. We 
also note a picture of homogeneity which appears to go beyond the definitional and 
terminological levels as initially suggested by Sandberg et al. (2009), namely in relation to 
exclusionary themes, positive criteria and the prevalence of customer/client input (strategic 
level). 
 
At the same time, there are significant variations at the strategic and practical levels namely 
thresholds for exclusion, the highlighting of key sub-dimensions, the extent of transparency or 
confidentiality, the industry-specific ratings, and the weights for each dimension. From a 
research perspective, the differences can still be characterised as being rather problematic for 
CSR researchers, stakeholders and other external users who may rely on ratings to provide a 
systematic, consistent and credible assessment of the social performance of a company. 
Notwithstanding, we partially concur with Sandberg et al.’s (2009) comments that the 
heterogeneity of SRI appears to persist at the strategic level (e.g. confidential vs. transparent 
approach; industry vs. general ratings) but more predominantly at the practical level (e.g. 
thresholds, weights).  
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In terms of the likely explanations for such differences, Sandberg et al. (2009) highlight three 
key reasons. First, differences may arise due to cultural factors relevant to particular regions 
or nations, and how concerns about CSR might have emerged; for example, in the UK 
compared to the US. In a nutshell, development in the former is typically associated to 
religious and moral imperatives whilst is concerned about diversity and human rights 
traditionally dominated in the latter. The second reason for differences in ratings 
methodologies can be related to the values, norms and ideology of the different actors 
involved (Sandberg et al., 2009) and rating agencies having to respond to varying 
expectations by clients, regulators, media and the general public amongst others. This can 
include changes within the ratings industry as a result of mergers, acquisitions or the 
involvement of larger international firms. Hence, this leads to the view that “…understanding 
SRI heterogeneity from the perspective of different stakeholders suggests that differences in 
how SRI is understood or defined could depend on who you are and what objectives you 
have.” (p. 525).  
 
A third reason which may explain differences in ratings methodologies is the need for 
commercial players, such as CSR rating agencies, to achieve and maintain a market position, 
and this implies the need to engage in a differentiation or segmentation strategy (Chatterji & 
Levine, 2008). In a similar vein, O’Rourke’s (2003) argues that CSR rating agencies have to 
develop a strong identity to attract investors. This can imply that a rating agency will adopt 
various tactics, whether of a linguistic, discursive and/or technical nature, in the design of its 
ratings methodologies to reinforce its market position. Also, Sandberg et al. (2009) highlight 
that there may be little incentive for entities involved in an SRI environment (such as CSR 
rating agencies) to engage in a homogenisation of ratings as long as market participants (i.e. 
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client-investors) do not demand for some form of common conceptualisation and metrics to 
operationalize CSR.  
 
In consideration of the factors which could explain similarities and differences (as put forward 
by Sandberg et al., 2009), we find very little in the way of national culture or norms which 
might underpin the observed differences and similarities. Instead we contend that the 
differences in methodologies seem to be primarily associated to a market-led strategy of 
differentiation, which incentivises heterogeneity and distinctiveness at the strategic and 
practical levels; thereby offering clients and investors the ability to consider the corporate 
social performance from different standpoints. Furthermore, the notable differences in 
industry weights and ratings may be symptomatic of the agencies’ dependence on companies 
and investors in a particular industry; thereby seeking to be flexible or ‘adaptive’ to 
client/investor demands. In terms of an explanation of the observed homogeneity, we argue 
there has been a noticeable rationalisation of rating agencies worldwide with a number of 
them merging, affiliating or being altogether acquiredvi. Although this is a market-driven 
dynamic, less attention has been paid to what we would characterise as a globalising trend 
where firms such as CSR rating agencies also seek to expand and capture markets overseas, 
particularly in response to the ‘mainstreaming’ of ethical investment on a worldwide basis 
(Sandberg et al. 2009).           
 
6. Conclusion and implications 
This paper sought to explore the methodologies used by a group of CSR rating agencies in 
evaluating the social performance of companies and in advising potential investors and 
clients. Prior studies did identify instances of similarities in rating methodologies whilst 
others had emphasised that significant differences appeared to persist. This has resulted in 
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debates about the need for greater standardisation, computational consistency and even the 
regulation of CSR rating practices. However, the empirical evidence was limited to specific 
CSR themes or only relied on publicly-available information. We therefore aimed to gather 
further exploratory evidence of practice from the agencies themselves. Our questions to the 
informants also focused on aspects not previously mentioned in the literature. Finally, we 
draw on Sandberg et al.’s (2009) conceptualisations relating to heterogeneity in the SRI 
movement as a tentative explanation of our findings; in particular, the levels at which such 
differences occur, and the reasons that may explain such differences.  
 
Although we would have preferred to elaborate our discussion of these issues with more 
rating agencies, confidentiality concerns were often put forward to decline participation or to 
elaborate further. We nonetheless obtained sufficient insights on the way agencies have 
actually adopted exclusionary and positive criteria, the CSR themes of interest and the way 
weights are attached to the CSR themes within different industries. In effect, we find a 
combined picture of similarities and differences in the way the methodologies are structured 
and implemented on an industry basis, and also in terms of the way these methodologies are 
communicated. Unlike prior studies (e.g. Chatterji & Levine, 2008), we argue that a strategy 
of differentiation is not the only key force of interest. We also propose that there is a 
rationalisation within CSR ratings sector, which in turn leads to a more globalising influence 
in local settings and thereby fostering homogeneity. In this regard, we tentatively suggest that 
cultural or national factors may well appear to be on the wane.  
 
Our paper’s findings therefore add to the literature by suggesting that rating methodologies 
adopted by agencies display similarities as well as differences. From the perspective of 
sophisticated client-investors or market-related users of CSR ratings, the differences or 
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similarities may be less of a concern given their appreciation of the malleable nature of 
ratings. Yet, one might contend that the reliability and availability of the CSR ratings needs to 
be improved to attract more usage of SRI screens by the ethical investors (Dilla et al., 2016). 
We would also argue there remains an issue of transparency for other social, indirect or 
regulatory stakeholders. In particular, there has been increasing attention on, and acceptance 
of, the role of accounting, reporting and assurance practices in supporting the implementation 
of the sustainability agenda at the corporate, State and third sector level. This has become a 
critical issue in the aftermath of the 2016 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the 
prominence of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the commitment to an enhanced 
transparency framework by a number of signatory countries. In such context, it becomes less 
tenable for CSR rating agencies to retain opacity and customisation if ratings are to be relied 
upon for transparency, monitoring and reporting purposes at national levels. Given the 
increased prominence of metrics in the CSR arena to compare social performance across firms 
and across countries, our findings highlight that the ‘devil is very well in the detail’ in terms 
of how intermediary organisations, such as ratings agencies, operationalise CSR performance.   
 
We acknowledge the following limitations for this study. A number of ratings agencies we 
contacted decline to participate in our study and amongst those who did respond, respondents 
were hesitant to provide more detailed insights or underlying motivations, often citing 
confidentiality as a means to ensure their competitive advantage. The relatively rapid change 
in the sector (mergers, acquisition and closure of agencies) also contributed to the challenge in 
obtaining a deeper access to some organisations. Therefore, we acknowledge that our 
findings, ensuing discussions and implications need to be considered in this light, and are in 
need of further validation. Our analysis therefore remains tentative but nonetheless of value in 
terms of suggesting avenues of analysis for further research. This issue of access has been 
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highlighted in prior studies (e.g. Sustainability, 2012) and a more in-depth access to different 
staff in agencies (similar to the in-depth study by Bessire and Onnee, 2010) would have 
certainly allowed us to explore the motivations underlying the use of specific methodologies. 
At this juncture, given the paucity of insights on the detailed aspects of ratings methodologies 
and the increasing importance of rating, it would be useful for future research to approach 
CSR rating agencies for a more in-depth understanding of the factors influencing the design 
and application of such ratings, potentially as part of an in-depth case study design.  
Potentially, Sandberg et al. (2009) does also offer a useful frame to explain why agencies 
might adopt different or similar methodologies and provide a starting point for a deeper 
analysis of the motivations and behaviour of CSR rating agencies.  
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 Carroll (1979) proposed four dimensions of CSR namely economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic 
responsibilities. In a recent paper Carroll & Shabana (2010) put forward what they called the five most common 
dimensions of CSR: interest dimension, social dimension, economic dimension, the voluntary dimension and 
environmental dimension. Even if several definitions of CSR were otherwise developed (e.g. see the analysis of 
37 definitions of CSR made by Dahlsrud, 2006), most of them agree on the threefold responsibility of the firm 
(Economic, Social and Environmental aspects) considering CSR as a company’s long term commitment to 
minimizing/eliminating any harmful effects on society and maximizing its long term beneficial impacts (Mohr et 
al., 2001). 
iv
 Examples of general criteria are Corporate Governance and Risk & Crisis Management (Economic dimension), 
Environmental Policy & Management Systems (Environmental dimension) and Human Capital Development 
and Talent Attraction & Retention (Social dimension). With regard to industry-specific criteria, in the economic 
dimension, we can consider Anti-Crime Policy & Measures for the Banking sector and Market Opportunities for 
Electricity. In the environmental dimension, Biodiversity, Electricity Generation or Water-Related Risks are 
examples of industry-specific criteria for the electricity sector. Within the social dimension, Controversial Issues, 
Dilemmas in Lending & Financing are examples of industry-specific criteria for the banking sector while the 
strategy to Improve Access to Drugs or Products could be a specific criterion for Pharmaceuticals. 
v
 We thank one of the anonymous referees for this pertinent point.  
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 An illustration of this rationalisation is the number of agencies worldwide identified by Chelli and Gendron 
(2013), which a few years later declined significantly when we sought to confirm the number of active agencies. 
More recently Vigeo and Eiris, the French and the British CSR rating agencies, announced their merger into one 






                                                                                                                                                                                     
Appendix 1 
  Agency  Country Founded 
1 BMJ Ratings France 1993 
2 Caer/Corporate monitor Australia 2000 
3 Champlain Research France 2011 
4 Covalence  Sweden 2011 
5 E. Capital Partners  Italia 1997 
6 Eco-Frontier Co. South Korea 1995 
7 Ecovadis France 2007 
8 Ecovalores Mexico 2010 
9 Eiris  UK 1983 
10 Ethibel  Belgium 1991 
11 Ethical Screening  UK 1998 
12 Ethicx SRI Advisors  Sweden 1999 
13 Ethifinance  France 2003 
14 FundacionEcologia y Desarrollo (ECODES)   Spain 1992 
15 GES Investment Services  Sweden 1992 
16 Greeneye  Israel NC 
17 IMUG  Germany 1999 
18 Inrate  Sweden 1990 
19 KO-CSR South Korea 2007 
20 Management and Excellence (M&E) Spain 2001 
21 Oekom Research  Germany 1993 
22 Reputex  Hong Kong 1999 
23 SAM Research  Sweden 1995 
24 Siris  Australia 2000 
25 Solaron India 2007 
26 Sustainalytics  Netherlands 2008 
27 The Good Bankers Co   Japan 1998 























                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Appendix 2 
STUDY OF THE METHODS AND CRITERIA USED BY SUSTAINABILITY 
RATINGS AGENCIES (SRA) -LIST OF OUTLINE QUESTIONS 
 
PART 1    EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
Some approaches/methods of rating exclude certain industries for religious, moral or political 
reasons or for their involvement in activities that threaten the environment, the human health 
or the ecosystem. 
 
(a) Do you exclude some industries from your assessment process?     
(b) For which reasons do you exclude these industries? 
(c) Can you give some examples of the industries you exclude? 
(d) If a company is involved in one of the industries you exclude, what is the level or 
threshold of involvement (e.g. as a percentage of its total turnover) that once exceeded, the 
company is excluded?  
 
PART 2    CSR DIMENSIONS 
In order to assess the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of the companies they rate, some 
Social Rating Agencies (SRA) identify and examine three or more dimensions (or themes) of 
CSR. 
 
(a) What are the dimensions/themes of the CSR that you consider in your assessment 
process?  
(b) Do these dimensions/themes have the same weight in your assessment regardless of the 
industry examined?  
(c)  What is the weight (in percentage) of each dimension/theme of CSR in the final score 
of the firm assessed? All industries or Banks / Electricity / Pharmaceuticals 
 
PART 3    SELECTION CRITERIA 
In order to evaluate all the dimensions/themes of CSR, SRAs define, examine and check 
numerous criteria for each dimension. These criteria can be common to all the companies 
assessed regardless of the industry to which they belong (general criteria) or change according 
to the industry to which the company assessed belongs (industry-specific criteria) 
 
(a) Do you use general criteria? If yes, what is the weight of general criteria in each 
dimension/theme of CSR?  
(b) Do you use industry-specific criteria? If yes, what is the weight of the industry-specific 
criteria in each of these three industries? Banks / Electricity / Pharmaceuticals 
(c) Any other information or method which influences your selection of criteria. 
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Table 1 Summary of Exclusion criteria (only for rating agencies using this approach) 






Ethical /religious and 
environmental (customized 
approach) 
Weapons, nuclear, child labor 




Religious and ethical 
(combined with a 
customized approach) 
Alcohol, Contraceptives, 
Tobacco, Gambling, GMO 
Food Production, Military 
army, Nuclear Power, 
Pornography. 
Up to 5% but some 
industries are 
excluded no matter 
the level of 
involvement. 
RA8 Ethical  Weapons, alcohols, Tobacco, 
etc. Fixed by the client 
RA9 Religious  Financial services, hotel industry. From 5% to 100% 
RA10 
Religious, Ethical, Political, 
environmental and long 
term performance  
Tobacco, weapons, nuclear 
power 
From 5% to 20% 




Table 2 Summary: weight (in percentage) of Social and Environmental themes by 
industry evaluated 
 Social Environment 
 B E P B E P 
RA2 50 40 60 50 60 40 
RA7 60 46 83 39 54 17 
RA9 21 29 30 39 38 36 
RA10 62 22 52 30 70 40 












                                                                                                                                                                                     
Table 3 Summary: weight of selection criteria by type, theme and industry 
 General criteria Industry specific criteria 
RA2 
Social : 60-70 % 
Environmental : 40-60 
% 
Banks : Social  30 % – Environmental 50 %  
Electricity : Social 35 % – Environmental 60 %  
Pharmaceuticals : Social 40 % - Environmental 60 %  
RA4 100% 100% (Products, Production process) 
RA6 Roughly 2/3 Roughly 1/3 in each industry 
RA7 40-50% 
Banks: Economic 47 % - Environmental 70 % – Social 40 %  
Electricity: Economic 51 % - Environmental 83 % – Social 
30 %  
Pharmaceutical: Economic 55 % - Environmental 50 % – Social 
56 %  
RA9 
Environment : 40-50% 
Social : 30-50% 
CG : 100% 
Banks: Environmental  52 % - Social 49 % 
Electricity: Environmental  58 % -  Social 70 % 
Pharmaceutical: Environmental  54 % - Social 70 % 
RA10 70-90% 10-30% 
For each theme (economic, social and environmental), evaluation is done based on both general and industry-specific 
criteria. Column 3 gives the weight of industry specific criteria in each theme within the three sectors, but the 
corresponding weight of general criteria is not given since our respondents only gave an average estimation of that 
weight for all the industries.   
 
 
